This week the Solomon Islands Parliament began discussing the Truth and Reconciliation Report which took place after the so named "Ethnic Tension" which first arose in the SI from December 1998 till it was brought to an end in 2003 with intervention from Australia and participants from New Zealand and other Pacific countries and collectively termed the Regional Assistance Mission or RAMSI as we have come to refer to it as.
The time of the civil unrest or "ethnic tension" brought about much damage to property, violent deaths, uprooting of civilians from their homes and places of work and heinous crimes of rape, sexual assault, wounding, arson and saw the crippling of the national economy as well of the end of a democratic government and the holding the Prime Minister of that government hostage over the barrel of a gun.
Some MPs in Parliament this week have said it is time to move on others have said the "big fish" behind the ethnic tension have still not been brought to justice and the Leader of the Parliamentary Opposition has apologized to those from Malaita for what occurred during those dreadful and unlawful actions from 1998 to 2003.
Yes, I do think it is time to move on, but that will not come easily to the many who suffered so much, and especially to those who had close relatives and friends murdered by so called wantoks, let alone to those who lost their work and lifetime possessions.
I too lost my life's work giving in to the belief that my leaving the country would give peace the chance the militants demanded of me. It was a mistake for the militants never had any intention to stop their wanton destruction, based on the urging of failed politician's and those who sought the ousting of a Malaitan led administration and the belief their land had been stolen from them.
After I left the Solomon Islands, I reflected on the time I served in the SI and also on the TRC as such.
Today, I would like to share some of my observations.
The (TRC) was convened in 2009 to look into events related to the tensions which engulfed the Solomon Islands, though mainly confined to Guadalcanal and Malaita between 1998 and 23 July, 2003, when RAMSI intervened.
Thee TRC’s five-volume final report – “Confronting the Truth for a better Solomon Islands” – was submitted to the Solomon Islands government in February 2012. In May the following year, the report’s editor, the Rt Rev Dr Terry Brown, published it on the Internet for all to see and read. The government had resisted calls to release the report, citing its size (it is 1,300 pages long) and sensitivity, and Fr Brown’s action in releasing it has been variously described as un-procedural and illegal. Undoubtedly, the premature release contravened the provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2008, but in today’s world of instant communications it is no use crying over spilt milk. Those eager to see the contents will have already accessed the documents irrespective of the legalities. Victims of the “ethnic tension”, or “national ordeal” as it also has been referred to, have reportedly welcomed the report’s release and some even praised Fr Brown for having the “guts” to do it. Fr Brown himself has said the report is very accurate and comprehensive but having seen the documents myself I do not fully share his conviction. Let me clarify what I mean.
Volume 1 contains this comment by the commission: “Underestimating the underlying issues of the unrest in rural Guadalcanal impeded a vigorous reaction of the police to resolve ethnic disputes and confront the rise in militant activity from the outset”.
In Volume 3, the commission comments: The TRC believes that the leadership of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force misjudged the situation when the conflict first began.
It was independently said of me and published in the local media
'Mr Short just doesn't dish out orders, but instead he carries out his own orders by going out to the communities around Honiara and mingling with the people, educating them about the work of the police. As in the above case, the Police Commissioner is seen as a threat to those who for so long are used to having things their own way. The threat in this case that these individuals feel shown up by the Police Commissioner’s modus operandi because they are the ones who, by virtue of their positions, should be going out into the communities whether around Honiara or in the other Provinces. But for whatever reason, they do not, have not and never will – except when they seek re-election during which time good old bribery is the light that shines before men and women so that they may cast their good votes and fatten their bank account yet again. What makes the Police Commissioner’s non-charlatan attitude so extremely tormenting to his critics is that residents have been saying things like, “look even the Police Commissioner, a white man, comes to visit us. Why can’t our Chinese, Polynesian or Melanesian representatives do the same? Who knows?” If our country was truly guided by the principles of democracy and the ordinary citizen could participate in the nomination of ‘real’ distinguished civil servants for the prestigious award of the Knight Commander of St Michael and St George, the person a great many of us would proudly nominate is Mr. Short. His show of professionalism during the national crisis has prevented our country from total political collapse."
In terms of the TRC, the audi alteram partem rule further requires that both sides of a story should not only be ascertained but should also be taken into proper account. Whether the principle of nemo judex in sua causa was properly upheld by the TRC in respect of my testimony might be questionable. The rule requires that those called to adjudicate between parties have no link with either side. When I gave my evidence in a closed session hearing before the TRC, one of the commissioners was absent and three, including the chairman, were Solomon Islanders, while another, the deputy chairman, was from Peru. In a society where the culture of wantokism exists, how much weight was placed on the statement made by the unnamed Solomon Islands police officer ( see below) compared to my own, as a foreigner?
Giving reasons for findings. The TRC, as a statutory commission, was required to give its findings on a balance of probabilities and had to show, at a minimum, the basis on which it weighed the probabilities and came to its findings of fact. In respect of the findings and statements I have highlighted, I consider that the TRC failed to do so. The absence, in my view, of proper reasoning makes it difficult to accept the findings or to assess how well the TRC fulfilled its obligations to carefully weigh competing evidence, and then to base its rulings on a balance of probabilities. Having dealt with some of the legal aspects of my rebuttal of the TRC’s findings, let me now expand my claim.
The basis of good leadership lies in having an honourable character and providing selfless service to one’s organization, and I believe that I exhibited those qualities. I also had a strong sense of direction and a vision for the future. I did not, personally, misjudge or underestimate the underlying issues of unrest in rural Guadalcanal or fail to give a response to militant activity. I illustrate my point by giving several examples. In my testimony to the TRC, I quoted from a letter that I had sent to the prime minister as early as November 1998: "There is a political dimension to the whole situation and this must be addressed in the shortest possible time frame if we are not to see growing militancy that could cause untold damage to national unity and inter-island relations, let alone serious infringements of the criminal law. There is a need for an effective and reliable, trustworthy police service capable of providing accurate and informed intelligence on which to base advice and action. The situation cannot be allowed to continue and the police service is coming under increased pressure to deal with crime trends, let alone having to deal with politically motivated activities that seem to develop from misinformation and a lack of national unity and provincial loyalties. Despite the often [sic] lack of in-depth intelligence, this report must be taken with seriousness and looked at uprising was prepared over months and as such was predictable, but no adequate measures were taken to prevent it. Among police officers and executives, ethnic allegiances prevailed over institutional loyalty."
Volume 1 of the TRC Report also contains the following statement, referring to the contents of a letter that I had presented to the TRC’s chairman:
Short’s appreciation of the situation, however, is not shared unanimously by all the executives of the RSIPF. A high-ranking officer interviewed by the TRC is still convinced that Guadalcanal militants could have been militarily defeated at an early stage of the tension with a more aggressive attitude. It then goes on to quote the unnamed high-ranking police officer as saying: “My officers were very capable officers. They were all trained by Australia, New Zealand and the US Military. If they were properly utilized at that time the situation would already have been contained at an early stage” I refute these findings, as the primary arguer, the TRC, had not established a prima facie case and such findings and statements are not based on either factual evidence or a proper weighting of the probabilities. The word “leadership” is vague and ambiguous. A vital question that must be posed, however, is whether the TRC complied with its statutory duties when it came to assessing the evidence I gave it and whether it upheld its obligations in making its findings in accordance with established legal principles.
The TRC was not a court of law, but it was a commission of inquiry and accordingly was obliged to make defensible findings. I make the case that it did not take adequate account of all the relevant evidence I presented, verify the testimony I presented, give adequate and fair reasons for its findings, or uphold the principles of justice.
1. Taking adequate account of all the relevant evidence. I had taken much time and care in preparing my testimony for the commission and presented it with two comprehensive volumes of evidence from which I gave oral testimony when I appeared before the commissioners. The TRC did not take adequate account of my evidence.
2. Upholding basic principles of justice. Established legal principles required the TRC to comply with the basic rule of audi alteram partem, but in a decision clearly detrimental to my role as Commissioner of Police, based on information given by an unnamed police officer, I should have been granted an opportunity to make representations or to submit other evidence in rebuttal. Even in common law, persons and bodies (statutory and other) have to observe the rules of natural justice by acting in a fair manner, i.e. both sides of a case must be heard before a decision is reached, i.e. no person can judge a case in which they have an interest.
The audi alteram partem rule further requires that both sides of a story should not only be ascertained but should also be taken into proper account. Whether the principle of nemo judex in sua causa was properly upheld by the TRC in respect of my testimony might also be questionable. The rule requires that those called to adjudicate between parties have no link with either side. When I gave my evidence in a closed session hearing before the TRC, one of the commissioners was absent and three, including the chairman, were Solomon Islanders, while another, the deputy chairman, was from Peru. In a society where the culture of wantok exists, how much weight was placed on the statement made by the unnamed Solomon Islands police officer compared to my own, as a foreigner?
Giving reasons for findings. The TRC, as a statutory commission, was required to give its findings on a balance of probabilities and had to show, at a minimum, the basis on which it weighed the probabilities and came to its findings of fact. In respect of the findings and statements I have highlighted, I consider that the TRC failed to do so The absence, in my view, of proper reasoning makes it difficult to accept the findings or to assess how well the TRC fulfilled its obligations to carefully weigh competing evidence, and then to base its rulings on a balance of probabilities. Having dealt with some of the legal aspects of my rebuttal of the TRC’s findings, let me now expand my claim. The basis of good leadership lies in having an honourable character and providing selfless service to one’s organization, and I believe that I exhibited those qualities. I also had a strong sense of direction and a vision for the future. I did not, personally, misjudge or underestimate the underlying issues of unrest in rural Guadalcanal or fail to give a response to militant activity. I illustrated my point by giving several examples. In my testimony to the TRC, I quoted from the letter that I had sent to the prime minister as early as November 1998: (see above).
Volume 1 of the TRC Report also contains the following statement, referring to the contents of a letter that I had presented to the TRC’s chairman: Short’s appreciation of the situation, however, is not shared unanimously by all the executives of the RSIPF.
A high ranking officer interviewed by the TRC is still convinced that Guadalcanal militants could have been militarily defeated at an early stage of the tension with a more aggressive attitude. It then goes on to quote the unnamed high-ranking police officer as saying: “My officers were very capable officers. They were all trained by Australia, New Zealand and the US Military. If they were properly utilized at that time the situation would already have been contained at an early stage”
His statement to the TRC was was ridiculous and coming from such a senior member of the police executive one simply had to wonder about his loyalties and his mindset. In the context of the TRC’s finding that my appreciation of the (security) situation was not shared unanimously by all the executives of the RSIPF, was totally untrue and it is worth noting that I had sent the following letter to the chairman of the TRC
"Dear Father Ata,
"One of your Commissioners put the question to me today at our meeting that I should have used the armed NRSF to put down the militancy. The question was fair and needed to be raised, but I would like to, once again, say why it was not a realistic or feasible option. 1. The police were used to respond to militant attacks and given arms for self protection but it became highly risky and dangerous since their vehicles often came under re from a “faceless enemy” concealed in the thick bush alongside the roads in the higher terrain. 2. Policemen deployed on missions had no protective clothing and their vehicles were also open and limited to carrying just a handful of personnel. Logistically the RSIPF was devoid of sufficient and adequate transport, as well as personnel. 3.The three sea-going maritime craft supplied and maintained by the Australians could not be used for operational duties demanded by the nature and scope of the militancy. 4. e government realized, albeit too late, the need for a political solution to the unfolding crisis and had sought the intervention of the Commonwealth. 5. The Australians, despite their non-intervention, had judged correctly that the RSIPF was not equipped, logistically, [or] numerically[,] and provisioned to take on the faceless militants who were capable of hit and run tactics avoiding the police easily. There was substantial evidence that the core militants were being manipulated and encouraged by power hungry politicians and by their fellow travellers amongst the ranks of the failed politicians. the aims of the GRA and had “spies” in the community, including young children. Any Malaitan SB officer entering GRA-controlled territory would have stuck out like a sore thumb and could well have been in danger. This is not to say that several brave officers did not risk attempting to penetrate the trouble spots."
I refute the findings, of the TRC as the primary arguer, the TRC, did not established a prima facie case and such findings and statements are not based on either factual evidence or a proper weighting of the probabilities. The word “leadership” is vague and ambiguous. A vital question that must be posed, however, is whether the TRC complied with its statutory duties when it came to assessing the evidence I gave it and whether it upheld its obligations in making its findings in accordance with established legal principles. The TRC was not a court of law, but it was a commission of inquiry and accordingly was obliged to make defensible findings. I make the case that it did not take adequate account of all the relevant evidence I presented, verify the testimony I presented, give adequate and fair reasons for its findings, or uphold the principles of justice.
Taking adequate account of all the relevant evidence. I had taken much time and care in preparing my testimony for the commission and presented it with two comprehensive volumes of evidence from which I gave oral testimony when I appeared before the commissioners. The TRC did not take adequate account of my evidence.
Upholding basic principles of justice. Established legal principles required the TRC to comply with the basic rule of audi alteram partem, but in a decision clearly detrimental to my role as Commissioner of Police, based on information given by an unnamed police officer, I should have been granted an opportunity to make representations or to submit other evidence in rebuttal. Even in common law, persons and bodies (statutory and other) have to observe the rules of natural justice by acting in a fair manner, i.e. both sides of a case must be heard before a decision is reached. i.e. no person can judge a case in which they have an interest.
Professor Woodman, in his Strategic Review of the Solomon Islands, had also “underestimated” or “misjudged” the unrest in rural Guadalcanal when the report was handed to the prime minister in April 1999, at a time when ethnic unrest was really causing trouble? The TRC appears to have overlooked that, very early in the unfolding situation, I personally conveyed premier Alebua to Tambea and Visale where, in his presence and that of Dorothy Wickham of the SIBC, I spoke to community leaders and appealed to them to help put an end to the spate of attacks on Malaitan workers. I followed this with an address on national radio appealing for an end to the violence. However, in the days that followed, in the very same area, a security guard was murdered, allegedly by the GRA because he had passed information to the police. This case highlighted the concerns about “payback”, all the more so because the deceased had been a wantok of those who reportedly killed him. In December 1998, the GRA launched a pre-dawn raid on Yandina Police Station in which the armoury was forced open and weapons stolen. A month later, there was a shoot-out on Bungana Island when the same group beached their craft en route to Tulagi in search of more police weapons. The incident resulted in the killing of one of the men by a rogue policeman who was suspended at the time. This constable was arrested, tried and sent to prison for 12 months for manslaughter. At my request, a full investigation was conducted by detectives of the New Zealand Police. Harold Keke and Joseph Sangu were subsequently released on bail by the Honiara Chief Magistrate, despite facing very serious criminal charges, including attempted murder. In my view, this miscarriage of justice allowed Keke and Sangu to re-engage in their criminal pursuits; if they had been kept in custody and tried and convicted the insurgency could well have ended in the early part of 1999. The TRC said “no adequate measures were taken to prevent [the onset of the conflict]”. Whilst it is true that we needed better intelligence (and I said as much in my letter to the PM), the TRC failed to address the fact that I attempted to recruit three senior ex-Royal Hong Kong Police Special Branch officers to assist the ill-resourced Solomon Islands Special Branch. Contracts were drafted and sent to the three potential recruits and were signed and exchanged, only to find that the government had no money to fund their recruitment. I referred to this in my resignation letter, which I had presented to the commission when testifying.
The very few detectives we did have in the security branch had no transport or covert means of gathering intelligence on which to base reports. Our capacity to know what was occurring in the communities on the Weather Coast was handicapped both by their inability to travel and by the isolation of the area and the ever-present problem of wantokism. The TRC was right to find that the rural community generally supported in the political context to avoid an escalation of the situation.
My letter was not acknowledged, either by the prime minister or any other government minister or officials.
When I did get an opportunity to raise my concerns in a report to the Cabinet in which I outlined the formation of the GRA, the then foreign minister, Patterson Oti, scoffed at the suggestion and simply got up from the table and walked out of the room. My letter was prompted by regular Special Branch reports that provided early evidence of a series of actions that indicated a growing threat to national security suggesting forced evacuations and raids on mainly Malaitan plantation workers and their families occurred in the northern plains to the east of Honiara, including Tasimboko and Malango. Similar reports started fltering through from other parts of the isolated Weather Coast and at Tambea and Lambi Bay. The instances at Tasimboko were first thought to have been of a domestic nature but our view quickly changed when we had evidence of beatings and damage to properties.
Much earlier in 1998, Ezekiel Alebua, the then premier of Guadalcanal, had used a speech on the occasion of Guadalcanal’s Appointed Day to claim that Guadalcanal land had been stolen from its people, and he restated this a couple of months later. These incidents alone rang alarm bells because I had a clear idea of what might follow in a society where “payback” played a significant role. My concern was not due simply to the demoralized and wholly un-resourced state of the police force, but also (and all the more so) because of the ethnic composition of the force’s personnel. I could sense real trouble ahead.
These incidents alone rang alarm bells because I had a clear idea of what might follow in a society where “payback” played a significant role. My concern was not due simply to the demoralized and wholly un-resourced state of the police force, but also (and all the more so) because of the ethnic composition of the force’s personnel. I could sense real trouble ahead. I therefore totally reject the TRC findings that the situation was misjudged when the conflict began and I also reject the assertion that “no adequate measures were taken to prevent it”.
I therefore totally reject the TRC findings that the situation was misjudged when the conflict began and I also reject the assertion that “no adequate measures were taken to prevent it”.
The TRC was established to examine the root causes of the uprising and it has taken until 2023 to come up with some relatively clear indication of the primary reasons. I had a clear vision of the causes from the onset and made my concerns known to the prime minister in my carefully worded letter.
Because the then RSIP was in such bad shape and incapable of handling any serious threats to security, I instigated an early Strategic Review of the Solomon Islands’ security needs by the Australian government in early 1998 – again a matter the TRC failed to acknowledge. The review was conducted by Professor Stewart Woodman (as earlier referred to) a senior defence analyst and adviser of considerable experience and international repute then on the start of the Australian National University (ANU). He was ably assisted by a seconded superintendent of the Australian Federal Police. At the end of their lengthy investigation, Professor Woodman said in his report: “The level of serious criminal activity throughout the country remains low”.
Professor Woodman had also “underestimated” or “misjudged” the unrest in rural Guadalcanal when the report was handed to the prime minister in April 1999, at a time when ethnic unrest was really causing trouble?
The TRC appears to have overlooked that, very early in the unfolding situation, I personally conveyed premier Alebua to Tambea and Visale where, in his presence and that of Dorothy Wickham of the then SIBC, I spoke to community leaders and appealed to them to help put an end to the spate of attacks on Malaitan workers. I followed this with an address on national radio appealing for an end to the violence. However, in the days that followed, in the very same area, a security guard was murdered, allegedly by the GRA because he had passed information to the police. This case highlighted the concerns about “payback”, all the more so because the deceased had been a wantok of those who reportedly killed him. In December 1998, the GRA launched a pre-dawn raid on Yandina Police Station in which the armoury was forced open and weapons stolen. A month later, there was a shoot-out on Bungana Island when the same group beached their craft en route to Tulagi in search of more police weapons. The incident resulted in the killing of one of the men by a rogue policeman who was suspended at the time. This constable was arrested, tried and sent to prison for 12 months for manslaughter. At my request, a full investigation was conducted by detectives of the New Zealand Police. Harold Keke and Joseph Sangu were subsequently released on bail by the Honiara Chief Magistrate, despite facing very serious criminal charges, including attempted murder. In my view, this miscarriage of justice allowed Keke and Sangu to re-engage in their criminal pursuits; if they had been kept in custody and tried and convicted the insurgency could well have ended in the early part of 1999. The TRC said “no adequate measures were taken to prevent [the onset of the conflict]”
Whilst it is true that we needed better intelligence (and I said as much in my letter to the PM), the TRC failed to address the fact that I attempted to recruit three senior ex-Royal Hong Kong Police Special Branch officers to assist the ill-resourced Solomon Islands Special Branch. Contracts were drafted and sent to the three potential recruits and were signed and exchanged, only to fnd that the government had no money to fund their recruitment. I referred to this in my resignation letter, which I had presented to the commission when testifying. The very few detectives we did have in the security branch had no transport or covert means of gathering intelligence on which to base reports. Our capacity to know what was occurring in the communities on the Weather Coast was handicapped both by their inability to travel and by the isolation of the area and the ever-present problem of wantokism.
The TRC was right to find that the rural community generally supported in the political context to avoid an escalation of the situation. The letter was not acknowledged, either by the prime minister or any other government minister or offcials.
When I did get an opportunity to raise my concerns in a report to the Cabinet in which I outlined the formation of the GRA, the foreign minister at the time
Patterson Oti, scoffed at the suggestion and simply got up from the table and walked out of the room, as I have said.
My letter was prompted by regular Special Branch reports that provided early evidence of a series of actions that indicated a growing threat to national security.
The first forced evacuations and raids on mainly Malaitan plantation workers and their families occurred in the northern plains to the east of Honiara, including Tasimboko and Malango. Similar reports started filtering through from other parts of the isolated Weather Coast and at Tambea and Lambi Bay. e instances at Tasimboko were first thought to have been of a domestic nature but our view quickly changed when we had evidence of beatings and damage to properties.
The TRC was established to examine the root causes of the uprising and it has taken until 2016 to come up with some relatively clear indication of the primary reasons. I had a clear vision of the causes from the onset and made my concerns known to the prime minister in my carefully worded letter. Because the RSIP was in such bad shape and incapable of handling any serious threats to security, I had instigated an early Strategic Review of the Solomon Islands’ security needs by the Australian government in early 1998 – again a matter the TRC has failed to acknowledge. The review conducted by Professor Stewart Woodman, a senior defence analyst and adviser of considerable experience and international repute then on the staff of the Australian National University (ANU). He was ably assisted by a seconded superintendent of the Australian Federal Police. At the end of their lengthy investigation, Professor Woodman said in his report: “The level of serious criminal activity throughout the country remains low”.
Much more of my comments on thee TRC and the happenings and events during the ethnic unrest I wrote about in my published book "Cometh the Hour" available on Kindle's bookshelf and rated by reviewers very highly.
Yours sincerely
Frank Short
